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Abstract
Immanuel Kant was an Enlightenment philosopher who strove to clarify the foundations of human
knowledge and morality. Kant began his cosmopolitan efforts by establishing the metaphysical
basis for all human cognition. His theories developed from an analysis of the writings of empiricist
David Hume and classical metaphysical thought. Causality was a paradigmatic metaphysical
concept that was assumed to be necessary and outside of the experiential world. Hume criticized
the role of causality as understood by classical metaphysicians and argued that knowledge can only
be gained from experience. His argument was based on the foregoing understanding of possible
judgements and necessity, which limited the amplification of knowledge to synthetic judgements of
experience. In response, Kant offered a new form of necessity that accounted for the metaphysical
basis for the possibility of all experience. Kant’s understanding of human action in cognition
informed his moral theory and the role of a priori concepts in moral action. Kant’s moral theory
is based on the possibility of a moral action being simultaneously free from natural determinism
and universally necessary. Following his dedication to the ideals of the Enlightenment, Kant bases
the possibility of morality on universal moral laws which are accessible to all rational beings. This
paper will evaluate the possibility of moral action based on Kant’s establishment of the necessity
of metaphysical concepts in human knowledge and experience.
Introduction
Modern philosophy and society have denigrated Metaphysics to the status of mere opinions
and feelings, stripping human action of a deeper reality than material motivations. Scottish
Enlightenment philosopher, David Hume (1711-1776) was a pivotal character in the attack on
metaphysical knowledge and the establishment of empirical investigation as primary. Hume’s
focus on scientific investigation of philosophical thought was rooted in his conclusions about
Metaphysics, that is the study of the reality beyond the natural world. As experience tells us,
things in the natural world are constantly passing away and changing. Classical metaphysicians,
such as Plato, sought necessary knowledge by leaving behind the contingent nature of the physical
world to grasp at pure Truth. Hume understood that gaining knowledge required investigating the
world, he, however, hastily discredited the role of metaphysical concepts in knowledge. If left
unanswered, Hume’s challenge to Metaphysics would amount to the elimination of any objective
basis for morality other than human custom and habit. Hume’s writings gave rise to the problem of
whether metaphysical knowledge was possible and could inform humanity about themselves, their
moral lives, and the world they live in.
Hume’s critique of Metaphysics was responded to by the German Enlightenment
philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). He responded to Hume by identifying a new form of
necessity based on the very possibility of experiencing the natural world, placing metaphysical
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concepts in the act of experience itself. Kant first identifies this new form of necessity in his
Critique of Pure Reason which focuses on understanding the aspects of human cognition that make
knowledge of objects possible. He develops the notion of transcendental necessity developed in
his Critique serves as the foundation of Kant’s account of the possibility of moral judgements.
Kant’s moral theory is based on moral action being simultaneously free from natural determinism
and universally necessary. True to his dedication to the principles of the Enlightenment, Kant bases
the possibility of morality on universal moral laws which are accessible to all rational beings.
The Basis for All Human Knowledge
Hume attacked the metaphysical assumption that causality was a necessary judgement
independent of experience based on the two accepted types of judgements. And Kant praises Hume
for helping him to identify that error, even though in Hume’s case the basic insight “struck a spark...
but brought no light” (Kant 2004, 7). Kant summarizes the spark that Hume struck regarding
causality as an a priori concept, that is a concept independent of experience:
Hume started mainly from a single but important concept in metaphysics, namely,
that of the connection of cause and effect, and called upon reason, which pretends
to have generated this concept in her womb, to give him an account of by what right
she thinks: that something could be so constituted that, if it is posited, something
else necessarily must thereby also be posited; for that is what the concept of cause
says. (Kant 2004, 7)
The foregoing understanding of necessity was based on the principle of contradiction
and applied only to judgements in which the predicate is contained in the subject term. Take for
example the proposition that “all bachelors are unmarried men.” The term ‘bachelors’ entails the
idea of ‘unmarried men.’ One cannot assert that bachelors are married without contradicting the
term bachelors, which demonstrates the law of contradiction and the apodictic necessity at work
in such judgements. These clarifying propositions, which Kant referred to as analytic a priori, are
necessarily true because the predicate is “covertly” hidden in the subject and is known through an
analysis of the subject term (Kant 1998, 141).
Judgements that derive from experience, known as synthetic a posteriori, “amplify” the
subject by connecting something to the subject that is not already contained within it (Kant 1998,
141). Hume had already noticed that synthetic judgements could not be established analytically,
because the predicate in not attached to the subject by way of contradiction. Hume asserted that an
analytic judgement can be universally necessary, however, judgements of experience cannot be. He
assumed that through repeated experiences of the connection between a subject and its predicate,
humanity can gain relative certainty regarding the synthesis. Hume did not reject causality, instead
he rejected the idea that causality was something that could be known necessarily because it puts
two things together, namely the cause and the effect. Kant agreed that if apodictic necessity, the
type found in analytic judgements, was the only type of necessity, then metaphysical knowledge
was not possible. Metaphysical knowledge would not be possible because necessary judgments
would only be possible in statements of clarification and not amplification. In response, Kant
develops a new type of necessity by exploring human cognition.
Kant begins the exploration of human reason by distinguishing between two types
of cognition; pure and empirical. There are some cognitions that are purely a priori, meaning they
“occur absolutely independently of all experience” which is contrasted by empirical judgements
which are a posteriori (Kant 1998, 136). Empirical knowledge is based on the phenomenal features
24

Sarah E. Minnich

The Possibility of Moral Action in a Kantian Epistemological Metaphysics

of the world and is therefore contingent and can be otherwise. Contingent knowledge can lead to
certainty which is gained through repeated empirical exercises. On the other hand, pure a priori
judgements can be known necessarily because they transcend the contingent nature of experience.
He explains that we acquire all our knowledge through experience, “all our cognitions commence
with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience” (Kant 1998, 136). He
qualifies this statement by adding “as far as time is concerned,” meaning that our capacity to reason
is stimulated by experience in time, but itself is not a product of experience (Kant 1998, 136).
What comes first in time is the actual experiential event, however, the principles that undergird the
experience are primary.
Kant’s qualification gives great insight into the possibility of experience itself and synthetic
judgements a priori, which are the amplification of necessary metaphysical judgements. He
explains that all empirical cognitions are “composite,” because each judgement requires a passive
and active component:
For it could well be that even our experiential cognition is a composite of that
which we receive through impressions and that which our own cognitive faculty
provides out of itself. (Kant 1998, 136)
The passive component is the phenomenon impressed on the mind and the active component is
the concepts at work in human reason that allows for the experience to happen at all. The object
experienced activates the reasoning capacity, however, this capacity is not a product of experience
but rather arises with it. An example of a “composite cognition” that Kant proposes is “every
alteration has its cause,” because, as he continues, causality “is an a priori proposition, only not
pure, since alteration is a concept that can be drawn only from experience” (Kant 1998, 137). Kant
asserts that a priori concepts are necessarily linked to the possibility of experience and are at work
in the synthesis of a cause with its effect. The concepts that transcend experience, but are activated
by it, are a priori because they do not “arise from experience” (Kant 1998, 136). Thus, Kant agrees
with Hume that causality accompanies experience, however, he demonstrates that experience of an
object is only possible with the application of a priori concepts to the object itself.
Traditional metaphysicians mistakenly attempted to know God, the soul, freedom, and
immortality by expanding reason to transcend experience completely. Philosophers like Plato
desired to go outside the realm of any possible experience to gain metaphysical knowledge. The
necessity of analytic a priori judgements attracted metaphysicians and compelled them to delve
deeper into “speculative” Metaphysics which was removed from the contingency of experience:
But what says still more than all the foregoing is this, that certain cognitions even
abandon the field of all possible experiences and seem to expand the domain of
our judgements beyond all bounds of experience, through concepts to which no
corresponding objects at all can be given in experience. (Kant 1998, 138-139)
Kant argues that what the metaphysicians were searching for outside of experience, namely
metaphysical knowledge, is inherently linked to experience and is at work in the very possibility of
experience. Sensible experience “awakens” our metaphysical concepts, such that an investigation of
our “composite” judgements is Metaphysics (Kant 1998, 136). Therefore, Kant not only overcame
Hume’s critique of causality but also destroyed the traditional understanding of metaphysical
knowledge which overlooked the a priori concepts at work in our empirical judgements (Kant
1998, 149). The traditional metaphysical attempt to grasp purely transcendent truths was replaced
by a transcendental view of metaphysical concepts, placing these concepts nowhere else but in the
actions of rational beings (Kant 1998, 150-152).
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Kant offers transcendental necessity as a solution to Hume’s criticism of metaphysical
knowledge. Human beings experience the world in a unique way which requires them to make
judgements about objects and connect them to a priori concepts. Kant explains that there are laws
that permeate all of nature, which allow human beings to experience the world:
The foregoing empirical rule is now regarded as law, and indeed as valid not merely
of appearances, but of them on behalf of a possible experience, which requires
universally, and therefore necessarily valid rules. (Kant 2004, 64)
For Kant, these necessary laws condition the possibility of having an experience and connecting
each perception to each other. He establishes the concept of transcendental necessity, which
allows for necessary judgements that are synthetic and a priori. These judgements are synthetic
because they allow the connection of two things that are not already contained within each other. In
addition, they transcend experience because they are the necessary conditions which make human
experience possible. Kant illuminates the “Humean doubt” about causality and Metaphysics by
establishing a new form of necessity and judgement (Kant 2004, 62).
Transcendental Foundation of Moral Action
Kant employs his foundational understanding of a priori concepts as the necessary condition
for the possibility of experience to understand the foundation of morality. Through his Critique of
Pure Reason, Kant explains that the a priori concept of causality is employed in the synthesis of a
cause with its effect, which is stimulated by experience itself. The application of a priori concepts
to sense perceptions is the necessary precondition for the possibility of experience. Kant explains
the role of a priori concepts in experience:
I, therefore, have quite good insight into the concept of cause, as a concept that
necessarily belongs to the mere form of experience, and into its possibility as a
synthetic unification of perceptions in a consciousness in general. (Kant 2004, 54)
He concludes that the empirical dedication of many philosophers, like Hume, is dependent on the
human application of a priori concepts to objects of experience. The necessity at work in experience,
transcendental necessity, is based on the premise that the concept that makes the experience
possible is not itself an element of the experience but rather it is at work within a cognizing human
being. This idea is best illustrated by a circle. A circle is defined as a series of points equidistant to
a central point. The central point is not an element of the circle; however, the very possibility of the
circle is dependent on the existence of that central point. As Kant critically evaluated the necessary
conditions of experience, he applied his understanding of human experience to the possibility of
morality; which hinges on the Good being both outside and within moral actions.
To begin his investigation into the grounds for the possibility of morality Kant addresses
the moral end of man. According to Kant, if man’s purpose is to be happy then human nature was
poorly equipped to achieve such an end. As he explains:
Now in a being that has reason and will, if the proper end of nature were its
preservation, its welfare, in a word its happiness, then nature would have hit upon
a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this
purpose. For all actions that the creature has to perform for this purpose, and the
whole rule of its conduct, would be marked out for it far more accurately by instinct.
(Kant 1997, 8-9)
If our true purpose is happiness, then we are not created to reach our purpose, because our reason
and will do not naturally bring us to happiness. Instead, an implanted instinct would allow human
beings to achieve their pleasures without reason interfering. The will then would be guided by
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inclinations and instinctual desires as opposed to the flawed reasoning of man. Kant proposes
instead that the purpose of beings endowed with reason and will is to be good. Kant begins the
Groundwork with this subtle distinction between happiness and goodness in order to demonstrate
that humans could be happy by instinct, which is to say automatically or without freedom. However,
unlike happiness being automatically good is not possible because goodness itself must be a choice
of a completely free creature. Freedom, therefore, is one of the necessary conditions of morality.
To demonstrate the importance of freedom, Kant begins by focusing on moral actions
that are in accord with human inclinations or consequential reasons. Kant offers the example
of a shopkeeper who refuses to over-charge children in his business practices. This action is in
accordance with a moral duty to not defraud others, however, the driving force behind the action
is a desire to promote himself and his business. According to Kant, an action that agrees with the
moral law may not be a moral action if the moral agent is inclined for reasons other than a pure
duty to the moral law. He also discusses an example of a person whose intentions are pure and
good:
To be beneficent where one can is a duty and besides there are many souls so
sympathetically attuned that without any other motive of vanity or self-interest they
find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the
satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I assert that in such a case
an action of this kind, however it may conform with duty and however amiable it
may be has nevertheless no true moral worth but is on the same footing with other
inclinations. (Kant 1997, 11)
There are people who do good acts, not as the shopkeeper did, but out of a concern for the happiness
of others. However, if the inclination, no matter how “good,” determines his action then the action
is not in Kant’s strict sense “morally good” (Kant 1997, 11). His key insight, in short, is that moral
actions, unlike those dictated by the natural law, cannot be inclined or caused. The natural world
is determined by causal relations, however, to step into the moral universe the moral agent must
leave behind natural causation. If our moral actions are caused in the same way as an event in
nature, then it would not be free and could not be moral. The focus on inclinations or consequences
to determine the morality of an action is to leave the moral universe of freedom and rely on the
causal universe of the natural world. Therefore, the beneficent man’s actions are devoid of true
moral worth because “the maxim lacks moral content, namely that of doing such action not from
inclination but from duty” (Kant 1997, 12).
Kant continues the story of the beneficent man to demonstrate the importance of clarifying
moral maxims from duty, not from inclinations or merely in conformity with duty. The example is
altered so that the beneficent man is overcome with grievous personal problems, depleting him of
his concern for the problems of others in such a way the he is not inclined to act for their benefit
(Kant 1997, 12). If this man continues to act as he had before without the inclination or “inner
satisfaction” to act but “simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine worth” (Kant 1997,
12). Prior to his grievous situation, the beneficent man was acting in accordance with duty and
good intentions, however as long as those intentions caused his actions, they were not moral. The
stripping away of all other inclinations or reasons to act demonstrates the moral worth of the action
as from duty to morality itself.
The role of the will and necessary moral law illuminates the emphasis Kant places
on acting from duty. The will is free to act in accordance to desire or inclination, however, the
will can be good “only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself” (Kant 1997, 8). The will
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can only be “considered good without limitation” when the object of its actions is nothing other
than the formal principles that undergird the possibility of morality, which Kant refers to as the
categorical imperative (Kant 1997, 7, 14-15). As he explains:
the unconditional and moral worth [of actions] can lie nowhere else than in the
principle of the will without regard for the ends that can be brought about by such
an action. For, the will stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its
a posteriori incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads; and since it must still be
determined by something, it must be determined by the formal principle of volition
as such when an action is done from duty, where every material principle has been
withdrawn from it. (Kant 1997, 13)
The unconditional moral worth of an action is based on freedom from material causes. As discussed
above, the natural world is causal and moral actions cannot be caused by natural inclinations or
consequences. Kant explains that “in adding anything empirical to [moral actions] one subtracts
just that much from their genuine influence and from the unlimited worth of actions” (Kant 1997,
23). Kant’s categorical imperative is an a priori “principle of the will” that brings about moral
action. The universal law is explained as a maxim which is formulated as follows, “I ought never
act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”
(Kant 1997, 15). True unconditional moral action comes from duty which is defined by Kant as
“the necessity of an action from respect of the law” (Kant 1997, 13). It is pure respect for the moral
law which impels the will to unconditional moral actions which derive their worth from duty. The
will must not be inclined by any natural cause, it, however, can be determined by the law and a
“pure respect” for the law so that in willfully complying with it an action could be “a universal
law” (Kant 1997, 14).
This account of a good will seems to present us with a contradiction within Kant’s moral
theory. First, he asserts that an action must be completely free to have moral worth, however, a good
will should be determined by a pure respect for a necessary moral law. This seeming contradiction
is answered by Kant’s formulation of synthetic a priori judgements and transcendental necessity.
In a priori synthetic judgements, the concepts make possible the action of synthesis within human
reason. A priori concepts are the necessary condition of the possibility of experience and they
allow human beings to experience through the act of synthesis. The application of concepts to an
object is a human action by which the object is represented in the mind; a priori synthesis is the
necessary condition of representing the object as an object in the human mind. Therefore, a priori
concepts are both necessarily involved in and yet outside of experience as was demonstrated in
the concept of a circle. Kant explains how this understanding of transcendental necessity applies
to morality:
Nothing other than the representation of the law in itself, which can of course occur
only in a rational being, insofar as it and not the hoped-for effect is the determining
ground of the will, can constitute the preeminent good we call moral, which already
present in the person himself who acts in accordance with this representation and
need not wait upon the effect of his action. (Kant 1997, 14)
The Good, therefore, is not transcendent as classical metaphysicians had claimed, but it is the
principle that is both outside and within moral acts. Humans must “act” not by virtue of the causality
of the moral law but by their representation of the law as a basis, in the will, for any moral action.
Unlike in natural representations of objects, the moral object of the law must be represented so that
what determines the will is a cause that does not cause actions stripping them of their moral worth.
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The thing that impels moral action, cannot be a natural cause because it must be free, so it must be
the condition for the very possibility of morality at all. The possibility of morality depends on a
necessary law which when represented in human reason is synthesized to the will so that a person
is impelled by a pure respect to act out of duty to that law. Kant adds to his understanding of man’s
purpose by stating “reason…cognizes its highest practical vocation in the establishment of a good
will” (Kant 1997, 10).
The establishment of “a good will” consists in acting as a human being, that is both inside
and outside of the causal order. As beings in the causal universe we are pushed and pulled by
various causes. Objects and non-human beings are unaware of the causal factors that dominate this
world. Human moral action consists in being aware of the causal forces affecting your inclinations
and choosing to act in accordance with duty and respect for the moral law. Human beings,
therefore, must have a ‘moral moment’ within this causal chain to choose the effect as opposed to
automatically living it out. Kant explains that in order for the moral law to command or necessitate
our actions, the actions must be universally applicable:
When the general inclination to happiness did not determine his will…there is still
left over here, as in all other cases, a law, namely, to promote his happiness not from
inclination but from duty; and it is then that his conduct first has properly moral
worth. It is undoubtedly in this way, again, that we are to understand that passage
from scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbor, even our enemy.
For, love as an inclination cannot be commanded, but beneficence from duty –
even though no inclination impels us to it and, indeed, natural and unconquerable
aversion opposes it – is practical and not pathological love, which lies in the will and
not in the propensity of feeling, in principles of action and not in melting sympathy;
and it alone can be commanded (Kant 1997, 12-13).
In understanding love as a command of the moral law, Kant’s answer demonstrates love as an act
of the will as opposed to an instinctual appetite. The will has the infinite capacity to be good, so by
placing love “in the will and not in the propensity of feeling,” Kant is emphasizing the importance
of the moral command. A person cannot be commanded to feel or be inclined in a specific manner;
however, good actions can be commanded because they rely not on the whims of human feeling
but on the infinite capacity of the human will.
Essential to Kant’s understanding of morality is his analysis of freedom of the will as a
necessary precondition for the possibility of moral action. Kant explains that there is a distinction
between ideas and concepts. Metaphysical ideas are not knowable because they do not enter the
sphere of possible experience. Concepts are activated by and make experience possible. There is,
however, one idea that Kant says is known purely by its necessity:
But among all the ideas of speculative reason freedom is also the only one the
possibility of which we know a priori, though without having insight into it, because
it is the condition of the moral law, which we do know (Kant & Gregor, 3-4).
The idea of freedom is completely removed from the causal world, so much so, that it is only
knowable as a necessary condition for the possibility of a morally worthy act. It is, however,
precisely the removal of the idea of freedom from the causal world that makes free action in the
causal world possible.
Kant’s emphasis on the will and freedom demonstrates his concern with ensuring that the
Good is not considered a “thing” but is itself an uncaused cause that inspires due respect and duty.
It is not some “thing” in the causal universe that you can point to and say this is “good.” Instead, it
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determines moral actions in that it must be represented in the human mind as an object of the will.
The Good is therefore within us, however, we do not contain or control it. Kant explains the unique
relationship of humanity with the Good:
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the
more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and
the moral law within me. I do not seek or conjecture either of them as if they were
veiled obscurities or extravagances beyond the horizon of my vision; I see them
before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.
(Kant & Gregor, 133)
The moral law should inspire “admiration and awe” because, like the “starry heavens,” it is
inexhaustible yet visible. For Kant, the moral law is visible, because unlike the transcendent
Good of Plato, he recognizes its necessary role in human action. For the will to be “good without
limitation,” it must will to be good, meaning will to act free from natural causation. Human beings
must as much as possible avoid acting like things in the world, moral action is therefore acting in
accordance to the possibility of acting freely.
Conclusion
Kant establishes a universal moral law that is accessible to all human beings by
redeeming Metaphysics as a necessary component of human cognition. The universal laws of
nature allow for human beings to synthesize concepts to objects to represent them in their minds.
The synthesis is caused because it is intermixed with natural things which are bound to the law
of causality. Morality cannot be caused by natural factors; however, the moral law necessitates
the very possibility of morality. The moral law is a necessary condition of the possibility of
morality because it allows rational beings to act freely. Universal standards for morality that are
knowable to all rational beings are not possible without the establishment of universal laws that
are independent of human action. The moral law, therefore, must be good in itself, meaning that
it is independent of human action, and it must also be the component of moral action that makes
it possible. The Good is transcendentally necessary because as the center of a circle, it makes
good actions possible. The moral law, as free from natural factors, impels human action with
an increasing respect for the law as represented in the human mind. For Kant the representation
of the law within human reason and will is an attractive force which impels good human action
from duty. As Kant explains, “that just in this purity of [the moral law’s] origin lies their dignity,
so that they can serve us as supreme practical principles” (Kant 1997, 23).
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